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Although this is not so usual, let us present two highly interesting new texts together, 
primarily due to the interrelatedness of their topics, but also for other similarities of 
theirs. Let us immediately start with the statement understandable to all those still 
prone to fetishise books: the Palgrave Macmillan factory knows how to do it. The 
format is ideal, and so are both the design of the (hard) covers and the choice of the 
printing font. And now to the subject.
Mark Bernstein (b. 1948) is Professor at the Purdue University College of Liberal 
Arts (West Laffayette, Indiana) and holds the Joyce & Edward E. Brewer Chair in 
Applied Ethics. He earned PhD at University of California, Santa Barbara, and later 
worked in San Antonio, Texas. He is known for his books on Fatalism (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992), On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters 
(Oxford University Press, 1998), and Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with 
Animals (University of Illinois Press, 2004). No wonder, thus, that Bernstein now 
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appears with the new title – The Moral Equality of Humans and Animals, fitting well 
into the Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series with Andrew Linzey and Priscilla 
Cohn as series editors, Clair Linzey as associate editor, and more than twenty titles 
as yet.
In a quite provocative and unexpected manner, Bernstein tries to construct moral 
equality of animals by relativising the value of human interests and life, and proving 
their unimportance. By questioning the supremacy of human interests over those of 
the animal and by „disvaluing“ the human death argument, Bernstein arrives to the 
conclusion that „we have no reason to accept the human superiority thesis.“
Once again at Palgrave Macmillan, A Rational Approach to Animal Rights was 
published in 2015. The author is Corey Lee Wrenn (b. 1983), a fresh PhD (2016) 
and a lecturer of sociology at Monmouth University, New Jersey, and Colorado State 
University. She is also a member of the Advisory Board of the International Network 
for Social Studies on Vegetarianism and Veganism at the University of Vienna and 
the founder of the Vegan Feminist Network (2013).
Unlike Bernstein, Wrenn departs from a more practical approach (and ambition). 
Knowing very well the nonhuman-animal rights advocacy scene, Wrenn, supporting 
“a small and marginalised radical faction” of vegan abolitionists, criticises 
vegetarianism and other compromising attempts at easing the suffering of animals. 
Wrenn’s ambition has been to create a coherent and effective path for animal rights 
activism, including a detach from philosophy and approaching scientific rigorousness 
(evidence basedness) and a rationality based on critical observation and discovery.
So, a more experienced philosopher (Bernstein) and a younger-generation sociologist 
(Wrenn) venture into animal morality and rights. The topic is very old: German 
Pietist ethics („the co-existence ethics“; Ethik der Mitgeschöpflichkeit), just for 
instance, expects for the „re-born“ (Wiedergeborene) a pityful and loving (barmherzig 
und liebevoll) behaviour toward animals.1 Even if old, the topic, however, also is quite 
hot: in 2012, the Berlin “zoophiles” fiercely opposed the German law banning sex 
with animals. For bioethicists outside Georgetown, animal ethics has always been 
a part of bioethics, not narrowed-down to the issues of biomedicine and research, 
but interested in all forms, matters, aspects, and phases of life. Those ideas were also 
advocated by Fritz Jahr (1895-1953) and Ignaz Bregenzer (1844-1906).
In his paper entitled "Der Tod und die Tiere: eine Betrachtung über das 5. 
Gebot"[Death and animals: considering the Fifth Commandment],2 published in 
1 Christian Adam Dann and Albert Knapp, Wieder die Tierquälerei: frühe Aufrufe zum Tierschutz aus dem 
württembergischen Pietismus, edited by Martin H. Jung (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2002), 113.
2 Fritz Jahr, “Der Tod und die Tiere: eine Betrachtung zum 5. Gebot,” Mut und Kraft 5, No. 1 (1928): 5-6.
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the Mut und Kraft3 journal in 1928, Jahr poses the question whether animals are 
really so close to be viewed as equal, to inforce his positive answer, Jahr quotes the 
Prophets, St. Francis of Assisi, M. Luther, F. Schleiermacher, German law forbidding 
animal torture, and other sources. The issue of animal protection is extended onto the 
next Jahr’s paper, entitled ”Tierschutz und Ethik in ihren Beziehungen zueinander” 
[Animal protection and ethics in their mutual relationship],4 which appeared in 
1928 in the Ethik: Sexual- und Gesellschaftsethik journal (favoured by Jahr). Here, 
Jahr’s argumentation departs from the thesis that compassion with animals results to 
be a ”phenomenon empirically given to human soul” and the only possible motive of 
animal protection (which makes feeling the obvious influence of A. Schopenhauer). 
Jahr, nevertheless, also asks whether the expanding of our duties toward animals 
necessarily leads to the neglect of our duties toward our closest ones. Jahr’s answer 
is: if such thing occurs, then it is a consequence of a “wrongful love toward animals” 
(falsche Tierliebe). Unusual for his time, Jahr claims that ”the one whose love is so huge 
to transcend the limits of the only-human” (über die Grenzen des Nur-Menschlichen), 
will not feel restrained to love toward only one social class, association, or a political 
party.5
The sources used by Jahr for shaping his animal ethics were numerous and 
heterogeneous, but some of them seem to have been more important and, obviously, 
influenced Jahr’s ideas much more. To that particular group, certainly Ignaz Bregenzer 
has to be ascribed. He authored the comprehensive book Thier-Ethik: Darstellung der 
sittlichen und rechtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Mensch und Thier [Animal ethics: a 
presentation of moral and legal relations between the man and the animal],6 quoted 
also by Fritz Jahr, as well as the study "Thierisches Sittlichkeits- und Rechtsgefühl" 
[Animal sense of morality and justice].7
In those works, Bregenzer primarily stands against all extreme, radical attitudes, 
independently whether they are directed toward „wiping differences between humans 
and animals“ or claiming that emancipation would „harm“ animals. Bregenzer thinks 
that the feeling (Gefühl) be the base for all mental processes, in humans as well as in 
animals, and he denies the intellect the importance in moral reasoning. According 
to Bregenzer, reason is crucial for the development of arts, science, technology, and 
3 A journal published in Halle, by Hallische Nachrichten, from 1924 until 1941.
4 Fritz Jahr, “Tierschutz unf Ethik in ihren Beziehungen zueinander,” Ethik: Sexual- und Gesellschaftsethik 4, No. 
6-7 (1928): 100-102.
5 Cf. Iva Rinčić and Amir Muzur, “Fritz Jahr: the invention of bioethics and beyond,” Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 54, no. 4 (2011): 550-556.
6 Ignaz Bregenzer, Thier Ethik: Darstellung der sittlichen und rechtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Mensch und Thier 
(Bamberg: C. C. Buchner, 1894; reprinted in 2012).
7 Ignaz Bregenzer, „Tierisches Sittlichkeits- und Rechtsgefühl,“ Deutscher Tierfreund 5-6 (1901): 1-41.
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culture, but not of happiness – on the contrary. He rejects the idea that animals are 
„reflex automata“ without soul, advocated by Descartes and Bethe, as well as von 
Hartmann’s advocating of human struggle against „harmful and useless animals“ (die 
schädlichen und unnützen Tiere). For Bregenzer, as well as for some other authors, 
the instincts are the base for morality, and therefore, animals must be capable of the 
development of moral.8
 It is pity that both Bernstein and Wrenn, probably because of the language barrier,9 
ignore Fritz Jahr’s and Ignaz Bregenzer’s works and ideas: even if seemingly outdated, 





8 Cf. Iva Rinčić and Amir Muzur, Fritz Jahr i rađanje europske bioetike [Fritz Jahr and the emerging of European 
bioethics] (Zagreb: Pergamena, 2012), 71-76.
9 In support of this, the more recent literature in German has not been included in Bernstein’s or Wrenn’s 
considerations either. Cf. Jan C. Joerden and Bodo Busch, eds., Tiere ohne Rechte? [Animals without rights?] 
(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 1999).
